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11 Introduction
Expected utility with additive probability theories, e.g, Savage's (1954) and
Anscombe and Aumann's (1963) are known as standard formulation of decision
under uncertainty. Since the seminal paper of Hart (1974), the question of ex-
istence of equilibrium in the unbounded securities exchange model has been a
subject of much development. In ¯nite dimension economies, one of a crucial
assumption interpreted as a no-arbitrage-condition be used to prove the com-
pactness of the individually rational utility (see,e.g, Werner 1987, Nielsen 1989,
Page and Wooders 1996, Allouch et al. 2002). This assumption together with
other standard assumptions are su±cient condition for the existence of equilib-
rium. However, in in¯nite dimension economies, the no-arbitrage condition are
not su±cient to ensure the compactness of the utility set. Therefore, to ¯nd the
conditions for which the compactness of utility set holds is interested by many
authors. (e.g,Cheng 1991, Dana et al, (1999), Dana and LeVan 2000). Recently,
Le Van and Truong Xuan (2001) have proved the compactness of utility set (
and hence the existence of equilibrium followed), in asset market with consump-
tion set equal to Lp, separable utilities and the continuum states which belong
to [0,1]. Following this direction, we consider a general equilibrium model in
asset markets with a countable set of states and expected risk-averse utilities.
The agents do not have the same beliefs. We use the methods in Le Van -
Truong Xuan (2001) but one of their assumption which is crucial for obtain-
ing their result cannot be accepted in our model when the number of states is
countable. Moreover, by assuming the existence of a common marginal utility
price, the proof we give is more natural and simple than the one given in Le
Van and Truong Xuan (2001). The existence of a quasi-equilibrium in L1 can
be also derived.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a proof of existence
of equilibrium in a model with expected risk-averse utilities the number of states
is in¯nitely countable. Section 3 we consider the case of continuum states as in
Le Van and Truong Xuan (2001) but we relax one of their crucial assumption.
Section 4 prove the existence of equilibrium in the case of ¯nite number of states
by exploiting the similarity of NUBA and WNMA.
2 The model with in¯nitely countable states
First, we consider the case where the set of states possible is countable. There
are m agents indexed by 1;:::;m. Each agent has a probability (¼i
s)1
s=1 in
the set ¢ := f¼ 2 R1 :
P+1




i=1 ¼i, a consumption set Xi = Lp(¼) with 1 · p · 1 and an endowment
ei 2 Lp(¼). We assume that for each agent i, there exists a concave, strictly
2increasing function ui from R to R and consumer i choose a portfolio xi =
(xi
s)1







We recall the notion set of individually rational attainable allocations A is
de¯ned by






ei and Ui(xi) ¸ Ui(ei) for all i:g
The individually rational utility set U is de¯ned by
U = f(v1;v2;:::;vm) 2 Rm j 9x 2 A s.t Ui(ei) · vi · Ui(xi) for all i:g
Let us denote, for each agent i, ai := inf ui0(z); bi := supui0(z).
Assumption 1 9 p 2 (Lp)¤, 9(¸i) 2 Rm











s) = Mi < bi
Remark From the assumption 1, we know that all the probabilities ¼i are
equivalences and hence equivalences with ¼.
Assumption 2 For all i = 1;2;:::;m; bi = +1.
Proposition 1 With the assumption 1 there exists C > 0 such that for all






Proof: From the condition 8 i ai < mi = infs ui0(xi
s) · sups ui0(xi
s) = Mi < bi,
there exist ´ > 0 such that
ai < ui0(xi
s)(1 + ´) < bi (1)
for all i.







3It follows from ( 1) that, for each i, there exist zi 2 L1 such that 8s, qs =
¸iui0(zi
s). Note that




xi if xi > 0
0 if x · 0
xi¡ : =
(
¡xi if xi < 0
0 if xi ¸ 0







































































































































































Remark 1. The condition (xi) 2 L1 is not su±cient for the existence of
Assumption 1, because the utility function can be linear by pieces.
2. In the proof of boundedness above, we used the property Ui(xi) ¸ Ui(ei).
However, We can use a weaker assumption that there exists a constant a such
that Ui(xi) ¸ a for all i:
Note that ps = ¸i¼i
sui0(xi
s) ¸ ¸i¼i







with all (x1;x2;:::;xm) 2 A. From this property and by using Jensen's in-
equality, we have the following Lemma
Lemma 1 There exists C > 0 such that for all (x1;x2;:::;xm) 2 A, Ui(xi) <
C
Thus we get the following Theorem which will be used later.
Theorem 1 With the assumptions 1 and 2, in the case Xi = L1(¼), for all






for all (x1;x2;:::;xm) 2 A, for all i:
5Proof: Assume the contrary, there exists a sequence (x1(n);x2(n);:::;xm(n)) 2





Without loosing of the generality, we can suppose that
P1
s=n jxi
s(n)j ! c > 0.



















is an ¯nite j 6= i, then for the simplicity, we can assume that there exists j ¯xed
such that i and j satis¯es the properties:
1. 9 Ei
n ½ N \ fs ¸ ng, xi








s = ci > 0







With each M > 0, de¯ne the set Si
n ½ Ei


















s = ci. The two probabilities ¼i and ¼j






s = cj > 0. Now consider the



























s(n) for all s. We will prove that
(Ul(yl(n)))l=1;m is bounded below, but is not bounded above, that leads us to
6a contradiction with the Lemma 1.


























































Let n ! +1 we have:
liminf
n!+1
Ui(yi(n)) ¸ vi ¡
ui0(M)ci
m ¡ 1
so for great n, Ui(yi(n)) is bounded below. Now we will see Uj(yj(n)).
















































So we have the limit
liminf
n!+1
Uj(yj(n)) ¸ vj +
uj0(¡M)cj
m ¡ 1
So if bi = +1, we can choose M very large, and the limit of Uj(yj(n)) is
unbounded above: a contradiction.
The next Lemma show that the sum is bounded uniformly.
Lemma 2 If p = 1, for all ² > 0, there exist N > 0 such that for all






7Proof: Fixe a 2 R arbitrarily, we have ui(a)¡ui(xi
s) ¸ ui0(a)(a¡xi
s), so with




















² with every (x1;x2;:::;xm) 2 A.
We know that U is bounded. Suppose that there exists a sequence in U
(v1(n);v2(n);:::;vm(n)) ! (v1;v2;:::;vn). We have to ¯nd that if (v1;v2;:::;vm) 2
A. Denote the sequence (x1(n);x2(n);:::;xm(n)) 2 A such that Ui(xi(n)) =
vi(n) for all i.
Theorem 2 Under the Assumptions 1 and 2, U is closed for every p.
Proof: Note that L1 ½ Lp for every 1 · p · 1. We have two cases:
I There exists M > 0,N > 0 such that for all n > N, for all i, s: jxi
s(n)j < M.
II For all M > 0, there exists n;i;s such that jxi
s(n)j > M.
Consider the ¯rst case. From the Theorem 1, we know that A is the subset of
a compact set of the product topology, then we can assume that xi(n) ! yi
in this topology for all i. For all s, limn!1 xi
s(n) = yi
s. jyi
sj · M for all i;s,
then yi 2 L1 for all i. For all ² > 0, choose N > 0 in the theorem 1 and the
lemma 2, such that the sum
P1
s=N ui(xi














































) for all i, Ui(yi) ¸ vi ) (v1;v2;:::;vm) 2 U.
Then we consider the second case. Suppose that for every M > 0 there
exists i and an in¯nite n such that xi
s(n) > M with an s, without losing the
8generality, we can assume that is true for all n and for an i ¯xed. Choose M
su±ciently large such that for all i, denote Ti
n = fs : jxi





2 With each M > 0, denote the sets Ei
n, Si
n as above. Choose M
su±ciently large such that M > M and Si
n\Ti
n = ;. ¼i and ¼j are equivalents,












We consider two cases:
1. 9 t 2 Si
n for an in¯nite n.
2. limn!1 minSi
n = 1.




s > 0. Without lost of generality,













Remarks that 0 < a < 1
































And yk(n) = xk(n) for all k 6= i;j. Easily, we see that
Pm
k=1 yk(n) = e. We are
estimating Ui(yi(n)) and Uj(xj(n)).









































































+ M] > 0
9with n su±ciently great. So we have the result that liminfn!1 Ui(yi(n) >
liminfn!1 Ui(n) = vi.

















































































We know that uj0(¡M) > uj0(¡M)=h2. Then liminfn!1 Uj(yj(n)) > liminfn! Uj(xj(n)) =
vj too.
Now we will show that we can construct a sequence (zk(n)) such that limn!1 Uk(zk(n)) >
vk. Choose k 6= i;j above. Choose ² > 0 very small such that liminfn!1 Ui(yi(n))¡
²ui0(¡M) > vi. Choose t 2 Ti






t (n) = yk
t (n) + ²
zl
s(n) = yl
s(n) in others cases








and then liminfn!1 ui(zi(n)) > vi.
Uk(zk(n)) ¡ Uk(yk(n)) = ¼k
t [uk(yk




t (n) + ²)²
> ¼k
t uk0(M)²
then liminfn! Uk(zk(n)) > vk.
By the induction, we can construct the sequence (zi(n)) such that
Pm
i=1 zi(n) =
e and liminfn!1 Ui(zi(n)) > vi for all i. Then there exist n such that Ui(zi(n)) >
vi for all i = 1;m ) (v1;v2;:::;vm) 2 U.
Now we return to the case limn!1 inf Si
n = +1. In this case, we will construct
10a sequence satisfy the properties: liminf Ui(yi(n)) = vi and supn sups jyi
s(n)j <
+1. If those properties are true for a sequence (xi(n)), we have nothing to do,
in the converse case, there exist i such that for all M, there exist an in¯nite n
and s s.t xi
s(n) > M. De¯ne i, M, Si














s (n). Then there
exists a sequence 0 · zi
s(n) · x
j¡









de¯ne the sequence (yi(n)):
yi













s(n) if s = 2 Si
n
We can check that
Pm
k=1 yk(n) = e. We have inf Si
n ! +1, so from the
Lemma 2





sjui(yi(n)) ¡ ui(xi(n))j ! 0
and
























So limn!1 Ui(yi(n)) = vi and for n great enough, for all s, we have jyi
s(n)j ·
M(m ¡ 1)jesj. By induction, in applying the same method, we can construct





9M > 0 such thatkyi(n)k1 < M
From Proposition 1, we can suppose that limyi(n) = yi in the L1. kyi(n)k1 <
M ) yi 2 L1 for all i. Then we have (y1;y2;:::;ym) 2 A with Ui(yi) ¸ vi,
then (v1;v2;:::;vm) 2 U. U is closed and bounded in Lp, so U is compact.
Now we will drop the condition of Assumption 2, bi = +1 for all i, we will
prove that with only Assumption 1, there is an quasi-equilibrium in L1.
Theorem 3 With Assumption 1, there is an quasi-equilibrium in L1.
11Proof: We construct the sequence of utilities concave functions ui
N : R ! R
such that ui
N(x) = ui(x) with x 2 [¡N;+1), for all N, ui0
N(¡1) = 1 and
ui
N · ui
N+1. Remark that 8x, limN!1 ui
N(x) = ui(x).
From the Theorem 2 and [2] we know that for N su±ciently large such that
xi
s;ei
s 2 [¡N;+1) 8i;s, there exists an equilibrium general (p¤(N);xi¤(N)).
From the Theorem 1, we know that (xi¤(N)) is in a compact set of the topology





s (N)j < ²
) in L1, the sequence (xi¤(N)) converge to (xi¤).
And the price sequence p¤(N) converge to p¤.
Suppose that there exist xi 2 L1 such that Ui(xi) > Ui(xi¤). Choose 0 < ² <













s) > Ui(xi¤) + ²






s) > Ui(xi¤) + ²




s (N)j < ² for every N.
Construct the sequence (xi(N)) satisfy: xi
s(N) = xi
s for s · M, xi
s(N) = xi¤
s (N)
if s > M, then we have Ui(xi(N)) > Ui(xi¤) ) p¤(N):xi(N) > p¤(N):xi¤ for
every N su±ciently large. Let M and N tend to in¯nity, we have p¤:xi ¸ p¤:xi¤.
3 The model with continuum states
In this section, we will give a proof with a similar result as the section above.
In using a utility function less general than [4], we can have the result without
the assumption H4 in their paper. The set of states we use here as Le-Van and
Truong-Xuan, the set [0;1], the consumption set is Lp([0;1]), 1 · p · 1, each





We de¯ne A and U as in the section above.
12Assumption 3 For all i;j, ai < bj.
Assumption 4 0 < m <· inf[0;1] hi(s) · sup[0;1] hi(s) · M < +1
Assumption 5 For all i, ui is concave and ui0(¡1) = +1.
Theorem 4 Under the Assumption 4 and the Assumption 5, there exists equi-
librium.




i=1 ei(s) for all




Proof: We will using the same method as the section 1. Note di =
R 1
0 hi(s)ds.
















































minj uj0(b) ¡ maxj uj0(a)
+
maxj uj0(a)

















So we have for all i,
Z 1
0







































Lemma 4 U is bounded.
Proof: U is bounded below, from the de¯nition of U. We will prove that U is








di ds) < diui(
C
di)
Theorem 5 U is closed.
Proof: Suppose that there exists a sequence (x1
n;x2
n;:::;xm
n ) 2 A, limn!1 Ui(xi
n) =
vi, we have to prove that (v1;v2;:::;vm) 2 U.
Firstly, we show that (xi
n) is weakly compact in ¾(L1;L1). Suppose the con-
verse, then there exists a sequence Xn ½ [0;1] with the Lebegue measure
¹(Xn) ! 0 and liminfn!
R
Xn jxi
n(s)jhi(s) > 0 for some i. With each s, there





m¡1 . Without loosing the generality, we can
¯xe i, and suppose that on the sequence En, xi


















n(s)hi(s)ds = ci > 0
























¡ M on Sn
yk
n(s) = xk
n(s) with other k or s
14Note that
P


















































n) = vk for others k.
So we have constructed the sequence (yk
n) with Uk(yk
n) is bounded below, and if
we let M ! 1, our sequence is unbounded above because uj(¡1) = 1, that
leads us to a contradiction.
Then the sequence (x1
n;x2
n;:::;xm
n ) is ¾(L1;L1) compact.
With each M, denote the set Tn = fs : jxi
n(s)j < M for all ig. We can choose M
su±ciently large such that Lebesgue measure ¹(Tn) > 1
2. Choose M very large
such that for all i, ui(¡M)h2 < h1ui(¡M). De¯ne Ei




Firstly, we consider the case that there exists i, liminfn!1 ¹(Ei
n) > 0. Suppose
not, then we can ¯nd i such that limn! ¹(Ei
n) = ci > 0. Without loosing the
generality, we can assume xi
n(s) > 0 on Ei
n. Using the same argument as above,







for all s 2 Sn
lim
n!1¹(Sn) = c > 0











+ M on Sn
yj
n(s) = xj







¡ M on Sn
yk
n(s) = xk
n(s) for others k or s


































then we have liminfn!1 Ui(yi




























We have uj0(¡M) > h2=h1uj0(¡M), then we have liminf Uj(y
j
n) > vj. We have




n = e, liminf Uk(yk
n) ¸ vk with
the strict inequality when k = i;j. Choose ² > 0 such that liminfn!1 Ui(yi
n)¡










n(s) in others cases










) liminfn!1 Ui(zi(n)) ¸ liminfn!1 Ui(yi














By induction, we can construct the sequence (zk
n) such that for all k, liminfn!1 Uk(zk
n) >
vk ) there exists n such that for all k, Uk(zk
n) > vk ) (v1;v2;:::;vm) 2 U.
Now we consider the case for all i, limn!1 ¹(Ei
n) = 0. In this case, we
will construct a sequence satisfy the properties: liminfn!1 Ui(yi
n) = vi and
supn sups jyi
n(s)j < +1. If those properties are true for a sequence (xi
n), we
16have nothing to do, in the converse case, there exist i such that for all M,
there exist an in¯nite n with s 2 Ei
n, ¹(Ei
n) > 0, s.t xi
n(s) > M. De¯ne i, M,




n(s) = es ¡ xi




















n (s). We de¯ne the sequence (yi
n):
yi













n(s) if s = 2 Si
n
We can check that
Pm
k=1 yk
n = e. We have ¹(Si


































So limn!1 Ui(yi(n)) = vi and for n great enough, for all s, we have jyi
n(s)j ·
M(m¡1)je(s)j. By induction, in applying the same method, we can construct





9M > 0 such thatkyi
nk1 < M
Then we have the sequence (yi
n) is ¾(L1;L1) compact. We can suppose that
yi
n ! yi 2 L1. And Ui(yi) ¸ vi for all i ) (v1;v2;:::;vm) 2 U.
Theorem 6 U is compact.
Proof: From Lemma 4 and Theorem 5.
174 The case of ¯nite countable states
There are m agents indexed by 1;:::;m, each agent has a consumption set
Xi ½ Rk, a vector of endowment ei and a continuous concave utility function
ui : Rk ! R . We ¯rst recall some standard concepts of general equilibrium
theory.
The set of individually rational attainable allocations A is de¯ned by






ei and ui(xi) ¸ ui(ei) for all i:g
De¯nition 1 A pair ((x¤
i)m
i=1;p¤) 2 A £ Rk is a contingent Arrow - Debreu
equilibrium if
1. for each agent i and xi 2 Rk, ui(xi) > ui(x¤
i) implies p¤ ¢ xi > p¤ ¢ x¤
i,
2. for each agent i; p¤ ¢ xi¤ = p¤ ¢ ei:
For x 2 Rk, let
b Pi(x) = fy 2 Rs j ui(y) ¸ ui(x)g
and let Ri be its recession cone. Ri is called the set of useful vectors for i and
is de¯ned as
Ri = fw 2 RS j ui(x + ¸w) ¸ ui(x); for all ¸ ¸ 0g
The lineality space of i is de¯ned by
Li = fw 2 Rl j ui(x + ¸w) ¸ ui(x); for all ¸ 2 Rg = Ri \ ¡Ri
Elements in Li will be called useless vectors .
The no unbounded arbitrage condition denoted from now on by NUBA is
introduced by Page (1987).
De¯nition 2 The economy satis¯es the NUBA condition if
Pm
i=1 wi = 0 and
wi 2 Ri for all i implies wi = 0 for all i.
There exists a weaker condition, called the weak no market arbitrage con-
dition (WNMA), introduced by Hart[1974].
De¯nition 3 The economy satis¯es the WNMA condition if
Pm
i=1 wi = 0 and
wi 2 Ri for all i implies wi 2 Li for all i.
18We will prove the propositions that give us the similarity under the NUBA
condition and the WNMA condition. Choose µ su±ciently large such that
k^ eik · µ for all i. De¯ne Tµ
i := ft 2 Li j ktk · µg. We de¯ne the new economy
~ Eµ = ( ~ Xµ
i ; ~ ui;ei) such that ~ Xµ
i := L?
i \ Tµ
i , ~ ui : Rk ! R de¯ned as the restric-
tion of ui on ~ Xµ
i . Evidently, we have ei 2 ~ Xµ
i for all i.
Proposition 2 If ((~ x¤
i)m
i=1; ~ p¤) is an equilibrium of ~ E then ((~ x¤
i)m
i=1; ~ p¤) is equi-
librium of E.
Proof: We ¯rst prove that p¤ 2
Tm
i=1 L?
i . For each i, there exist ²i such that
ui(~ x¤
i+²i) > ui(~ x¤
i). 8 yi 2 Ti, ui(~ x¤
i+²i+yi) > ui(~ xi) ) ~ p¤:(~ x¤
i+²i+yi) > ~ p¤:~ x¤
i.
Let ²i ! 0, we have ~ p¤:yi ¸ 0. With the similar argument, we found that
~ p¤:(¡yi) ¸ 0 ) ~ p¤:yi = 0 8 yi 2 Tµ
i ) ~ p¤ 2 L?
i 8 i.
Observe that ((~ x¤
i)m





i ei. Now let
ui(xi) > ui(~ x¤
i) ) ui(x?
i ) > ui(~ x¤
i) ) ~ p¤:x?
i > ~ p¤:~ x¤
i ) ~ p¤:(x?




i=1; ~ p¤) is equilibrium of E.
Proposition 3 If ((x¤
i)m
i=1;p¤) is an equilibrium of E, then there exists µ > 0
such that ((x¤
i)m
i=1;p¤) is equilibrium of ~ Eµ.
Proof: Choose µ ¸ maxfkx¤
ik;k^ eikg.
Proposition 4 The economy E satis¯es Weak No Market Arbitrage condition
if and only if ~ E satis¯es No Unbounded Arbitrage condition.
Proof: Firstly, suppose that E satis¯es WNMA condition. In the economy ~ E,
Lµ
i = f0g, so Rµ
i = Ri \ L? 8 i. Suppose that wi 2 Rµ
i such that
P
i wi = 0 )
wi 2 Li for all i, ) wi 2 L?
i \ Li ) wi = 0 8 i.
Suppose that ~ E satis¯es NUBA condition. If wi 2 Ri such that
P




i = 0 ) w?
i = 0 for all i from the NUBA properties ) wi 2 Li
8i.
Now we de¯ne the notion of no-arbitrage price as in Allouch, Le Van, Page
(2002) and the NAPS notion:
De¯nition 4 Si =
(
fp 2 L?
i j p:w > 0;8 w 2 (Ri \ L?
i )nf0g if RinLi 6= ;g
L?
i if Ri = Li
)
De¯nition 5 The economy E satis¯es the NAPS condition if \iSi 6= ;.
19Proposition 5 (Page and Wooders, 1996) Assume Li = f0g, 8 i, then NUBA
) NAPS.
Proof: In [5]
Proposition 6 (Allouch, LeVan and Page (2002))
WNMA ) \iSi 6= ;.
Proof: In [1]
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